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I. INTRODUCTION
In several recent, highly publicized murder cases involving pre-teens
and teenagers, prosecutors have used the felony-murder rule to ensure con-
viction of these young defendants.' The felony-murder rule makes it easier
* Steven A. Drizin is a Clinical Professor of Law at Northwestern University School of
Law in Chicago; he played a role as amicus in the Lionel Tate case, discussed infra at
Part II.A.
** Allison McGowen Keegan is an associate at Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati in
San Francisco, California.
1. Nathaniel Brazill, age thirteen; Lionel Tate, age twelve; Jonathan Miller, age fifteen;
Jon R. Morgan, age fourteen. Jon Morgan was tried and convicted in adult court for the mur-
der of his grandparents, Keith and Lila Cearlocks. People v. Morgan, 718 N.E.2d 206 (11.
App. Ct. 1999). The jury was instructed that Jon could be convicted of both know-
ing/intentional murder and felony-murder. Id. at 210. The predicate felonies were aggravated
battery and discharge of a firearm. Id. at 211. On appeal, the court found that it was an error
to instruct the jury that Morgan could be convicted under felony-murder theory because the
1
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for prosecutors to gain convictions because it relieves them of the often on-
erous burden of proving that the teenage defendant intended to kill the vic-
tim. Instead, prosecutors need only prove that the defendant intended to
commit the underlying predicate felony, and need not offer any proof that
death was an intended or even a foreseeable consequence.
An examination of the history of the felony-murder rule, the tension be-
tween the felony-murder rule and the common law infancy defense, and the
policies underlying each rule demonstrates that the felony-murder rule was
never intended to be applied to children under the age of fourteen. First, the
common law doctrine of incapacity is more firmly rooted in history than the
felony-murder rule and predates the felony-murder rule by centuries. More-
over, criminal capacity is a necessary prerequisite to criminal mens rea. Be-
fore one can apply the felony-murder rule, which dispenses with the mens
rea requirement of murder, courts must first find that the child-defendant is
capable of forming criminal intent. The infancy defense is based on the pre-
sumption that a child-defendant between the ages of seven and fourteen is
incapable of forming criminal intent. When these two common law creations
clash, as they have in several recent cases, the infancy defense should super-
sede the felony-murder rule.
Longstanding developmental psychological' research into the cognitive
capacity of teenagers also buttresses the argument that the felony-murder
rule should not be applied to children under fourteen, and perhaps not to
older adolescents either.3 This research reveals that many pre-adolescents
and adolescents 4 are not competent to stand trial, i.e., incapable of under-
standing the legal proceedings against them, and unable to meaningfully as-
sist in their own defense.5 More recent social science research suggests that
juveniles, particularly those under age fifteen, as a class, make decisions
differently than adults, and are more susceptible to influence, more impul-
sive, less risk-adverse, and less capable of seeing the long-term conse-
quences of their actions. 6 Finally, emerging research from the field of neuro-
predicate felonies did not involve conduct with a felonious purpose other than the killing
itself Id. at 212.
2. Developmental psychology is "the scientific study of changes in physical, intellec-
tual, emotional, and social development over the life cycle." Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth
Cauffman, The Elephant in the Courtroom: A Developmental Perspective on the Adjudication
of Youthful Offenders, 6 VA. J. SOC. POL'v & L. 389, 391 (1999).
3. Id. at 401-04.
4. Pre-adolescents are those children under the age of twelve; adolescents are those
between the ages of twelve and seventeen; those ages eighteen to twenty-four are often called
young adults. See generally id.
5. Id.
6. See id.
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science, using MRIs and other technologies which scan the brain, suggests
that differences in the organic structure and function of the teenage brain
extend these disabilities in impulse control and decision-making into the late
teens and early twenties.7
This article will begin with case studies of juveniles charged with first-
degree murder under the felony-murder doctrine. Next, the article will re-
view the historical underpinnings of the felony-murder rule and the common
law defense of infancy, and argue that as an historical matter, the felony-
murder rule was never intended to apply to juvenile offenders under the age
of fourteen. In addition, we will argue that none of the philosophical justifi-
cations for the felony-murder rule make strong sense when applied to these
juveniles and older adolescents. In Part IV, we will review the recent social
science and brain development research which supports limiting the felony-
murder rule to adult defendants. In the concluding section, we will suggest
some policy changes that could reduce the impact the felony-murder rule has
on teenage defendants.
II. CASE STUDIES
A. Lionel Tate
Six-year-old Tiffany Eunick died on July 28, 1999, after playing much
of the day with twelve-year-old Lionel Tate, a 166-pound-boy who claimed
that he had been practicing professional wrestling moves on the girl as they
played in his Pembroke Park, Florida home.8 The medical examiner's find-
ings did not support Lionel's claims that he and Tiffany were involved in
innocuous roughhousing.9 Lionel's story that he had picked up Tiffany in a
bear hug while they were playing tag and accidentally hit her head on a cof-
fee table did not square with the evidence of her extensive injuries, including
head trauma, lacerations to her liver, and several broken ribs. 10 Broward
County prosecutors brought Lionel's case before a grand jury on August 11,
1999, seeking charges of murder in adult court." Since Lionel was origi-
nally charged with an open count of murder, the grand jury could have re-
turned with an indictment for first or second-degree murder, or decided that
7. See Paul Thompson, Editorial, Brain Research Shows a Child Is Not an Adult, SUN-
SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), May 25, 2001, at 31A, available at 2001 WL 2680069.
8. Jodie Needle, Boy Charged with Murder in Death of Playmate, 6, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft.
Lauderdale), Aug. 12, 1999, at 1B, available at 1999 WL 20275653.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
3
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there was not sufficient evidence to indict.'2 After listening to medical testi-
mony and other witnesses, the grand jury indicted Lionel for first-degree
murder, making him among the youngest children in the country to face such
charges in adult court.' 3 Under Florida's statutory scheme, if Lionel were
convicted of first-degree murder, the judge would have no choice but to sen-
tence him to life in prison without the possibility of parole. 4
On February 15, 2000, Broward County prosecutors reportedly offered
to let Lionel plead guilty to second-degree murder in exchange for a sentence
of three years in a juvenile center, one year of house arrest, ten years of psy-
chological testing and counseling, and 1,000 hours of community service. 5
However, Lionel, his mother, and his attorney, Jim Lewis, rejected the of-
fer. 6 The case took a bizarre twist when Lewis announced that he planned to
argue that his client was imitating the moves he had learned from watching
professional wrestlers on television. 7 When Lewis sought to subpoena sev-
eral pro-wrestling stars to testify at trial, including The Rock, Sting, and
Hulk Hogan, the move prompted a backlash from attorneys representing the
wrestlers. 8 Lionel's defense is an .'I saw it on tv so I go free' excuse," ex-
claimed Jerry McDevitt, a Pittsburgh attorney who represents Dwayne "The
Rock" Johnson. 9 He "is a 12-year old punk who didn't learn that you don't
beat up little girls. 2 0  The World Wrestling Entertainment, the largest or-
ganization of professional wrestling promotions, sued Lewis for libel. 2'
It was not until a hearing on May 4, 2000, on the issue of whether the
use of the wrestling defense was acceptable that Ken Padowitz, Assistant
State Attorney, first argued that Lionel committed aggravated child abuse
and was guilty of felony-murder.2  Prior to that day, Padowitz had argued
12. Id.
13. Needle, supra note 8.
14. FLA. STAT. § 775.082 (1) (2003).
15. Paula McMahon, Prosecutor Favors Lighter Sentence Leniency Pleas Ahead in
Conviction of Tate, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Jan. 27, 2001, at IA, available at 2001
WL 2655604.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Paula McMahon, Judge Excuses Wrestlers from Testifying in Slaying Defense Says
Suspect Was Mimicking Pros, SUN-SENTNEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Apr. 12, 2000, at IA, available
at 2000 WL 5652142.
19. See id.
20. Id.
21. Brad Bennett, Attorney Second-Guesses Strategy, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 26, 2001, at
8A, available at 2001 WL 11643548.
22. See Paula McMahon, Boy Re-enacts Final Moments of Girl's Life 6-Year-Old Died
After Suffering Severe Injuries Prosecution Says Videotape Tainted, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft.
Lauderdale), May 5, 2000, at I B, available at 2000 WL 5657578 [hereinafter McMahon I].
[Vol. 28:3:507
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that Lionel had intentionally killed Tiffany Eunick.2 3 Two weeks before the
trial was to begin, on January 5, 2001, prosecutors again offered Lionel the
same plea deal.24  He rejected it a second time. 5  It was a decision that
Lionel, his mother, and his attorney would come to regret. After deliberating
just over three hours, jurors returned a verdict convicting the boy of first-
degree felony-murder.26 Under Florida law, the judge had no choice but to
sentence Lionel to a term of life without the possibility of parole.2 7  The
prosecution used aggravated child abuse as the predicate offense for the fel-
ony-murder conviction of Lionel Tate, 2 a questionable move given that
Lionel was too young to be tried as an adult for aggravated child abuse. In
Florida, aggravated child abuse is a specific intent crime.29 In convicting
Lionel, the jury concluded that he had intended to abuse Tiffany and that the
abuse resulted in her death.3" Tate's case seems to be an instance where the
23. See id.
24. Teen Rejects Deal, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Jan. 6, 2001, at 3B, available at
2001 WL 2652031.
25. Id. Can a twelve or thirteen-year-old child like Lionel Tate be expected to appreciate
the consequences of pleading guilty to murder in adult court? Can he or she truly understand
the jeopardy faced by rejecting a plea? Can a present-oriented, impulsive adolescent possibly
fathom a sentence of life without the possibility of parole? These are just a few of the ques-
tions of "adjudicative competence" posed by the Lionel Tate case and others. Such questions,
which raise concerns about the fundamental fairness of trying children as adults, were ignored
by policymakers in their rush to pass punitive laws. The answers to these and other questions
have been studied by the Research Network on Adolescent Development, an initiative funded
by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, and the results were recently pub-
lished. See Thomas Grisso et al., Juveniles' Competence to Stand Trial: A Comparison of
Adolescents' and Adults' Capacities as Trial Defendants, 27 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 333-63
(2003) (finding juveniles aged fifteen and younger were less likely to recognize the risks
inherent in different choices and less likely to think about the long-term consequences of their
choices, indicating that, compared to adults, juvenile offenders are probably not competent to
stand trial in a criminal proceeding).
26. Paula McMahon, Boy Convicted in Girl's Death, Verdict: First Degree Murder,
SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Jan. 26, 2001, at IA, available at 2001 WL 2655383 [herein-
after McMahon II]. It is possible that a sentence of life without parole for a twelve-year-old
convicted of felony-murder may be unconstitutionally "cruel and unusual" punishment under
state constitutional law. See People v. Dillon, 668 P.2d 697, 727 (Cal. 1983) (holding that
application of felony-murder rule to seventeen-year-old defendant is unconstitutional). Al-
though, as a matter of federal constitutional law, that argument is unlikely to prevail in light of
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 77 (2003)
(upholding California's application of three strikes law in a case involving two consecutive
twenty-five to life sentences for petty theft).
27. See § 775.082 (1).
28. McMahon 1, supra note 22.
29. See § 827.03(2).
30. See McMahon II, supra note 26.
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prosecution used felony-murder as a means to ease its burden of proof yet
still get a first-degree murder conviction.
On appeal, Lionel Tate challenged his conviction on several grounds,
including that the felony-murder rule should not apply to children, who at
common law, were protected by the infancy defense, and that it was "cruel
and unusual" punishment to sentence a twelve-year-old convicted of felony
murder to life without the possibility of parole.3 On December 10, 2003,
after this article had been finished, the Florida Court of Appeals reversed
Tate's conviction, holding that the trial court had erred when it failed to hold
a post-trial hearing to determine if Tate was competent before sentencing
Tate.32
Although the Florida Court of Appeals reversed Tate's conviction, it
neither rejected nor directly resolved the issues raised by this article. With
regard to the propriety of applying the felony-murder doctrine to a twelve-
year-old, the Court held that the legislature had supplanted the common law
infancy defense when it created laws allowing for juveniles to be prosecuted
as adults.33 Twelve-year-olds in Florida, at least those eligible to be tried as
adults, are no longer presumed to be incapable of forming criminal intent.34
The court also held that a life without parole sentence for a twelve-year-old
child convicted of first-degree murder is not "cruel or unusual punishment"
under the Florida Constitution or "cruel and unusual punishment" under the
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.35 The court declined
to address the specific question of whether life without parole for a twelve-
year-old convicted of felony murder was unconstitutional, finding that the
jury returned a "general verdict" of first degree murder.36
Lionel Tate's case was quickly resolved once the case was remanded to
the trial court after the victorious appeal. Prosecutors offered Tate the same
31. Professor Drizin wrote parts of two amicus briefs filed before the Florida Court of
Appeals in the Tate case. Copies of both of these briefs are available on-line on the website of
the Juvenile Law Center at http://www.jlc.org/.
32. Tate v. Florida, 864 So. 2d 44, 44 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
33. id. at 53.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 54.
36. Id. at 54-55. At the time of Tate's conviction, Article I, Section 17, of the Florida
Constitution prohibited "cruel or unusual punishment." The constitution was later amended in
2002 to prohibit "cruel and unusual punishment," mirroring the language of the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. In 1999, the Supreme Court of Florida, in
Brennan v. State, 754 So. 2d 1 (1999), ruled that the death penalty was unconstitutional when
applied to sixteen-year-olds because such a punishment was "unusual" in the history of Flor-
ida. As both the attorneys for Tate and amicus argued in Tate's appeal, a life without parole
sentence for a twelve-year-old was not only unusual in Florida but unprecedented in both
Florida and the entire United States.
[Vol. 28:3:507
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plea bargain that they had offered him on the eve of his earlier trial. This
time Tate accepted the deal. Because he had already served nearly three
years in prison, Tate was eligible for release. On January 29, 2004, Tate
pleaded guilty to second degree murder and was released. He was fitted with
an electronic bracelet which he will have to wear for one year while under
house arrest, will remain on probation for ten years, is required to perform
1,000 hours of community service, and will receive regular psychological
counseling.37
B. Nathaniel Brazill
On May 26, 2000, the last day of school at Lake Worth Middle School,
an assistant principal sent thirteen-year-old Nathaniel Brazill home for
throwing water balloons. 38 Less than two hours later, just minutes before
students were to go home for the summer, Brazill returned to the school with
a small gun he had stolen from the residence of a family friend.39 When
thirty-five-year-old Barry Grunow, a language-arts teacher, refused to allow
Brazill into his classroom to speak to two students, Brazill pulled out the gun
and shot Grunow in the head.4' These events were dramatically captured on
a school video camera.4 After firing the single shot, Brazill turned to leave
the school and pointed the weapon at another teacher who had come out of
his classroom.42 Nathaniel left the school and was just blocks from the scene
when he surrendered to a police officer.4 3 He saw a police patrol car, raised
his arms and kneeled." He told the officer, "I shot somebody," and that he
had a gun in his pocket.45 Back at the police station, Brazill was interrogated
by police officers and readily admitted shooting Mr. Grunow." In a telling
moment caught on videotape when the cameras were still rolling and while
37. See Paula McMahon, Tate Enters Guilty Plea. Both Sides in Case Say Judges Should
Have More Discretion in Sentencing Juveniles, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Jan. 30, 2004
at lB, available at 2004 WL 67630226.
38. See Mitch Lipka, Teacher Slain; Student Charged; Boy, 13, Faces First-Degree
Murder Count; Shooting Occurs on Last Day of School, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), May
27, 2000, at IA, available at 2000 WL 22175569.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Lipka, supra note 38.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See id.
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the officers were out of the room, Brazill put his head in his hands and cried,
"What was I thinking?
4 7
Prosecutors brought the case before a special grand jury, seeking
charges of first-degree murder.48 State Attorney Barry Krischer vowed to try
Nathaniel as an adult from the beginning, wanting the young boy to serve
"adult time for an adult crime., 49 As Krischer saw it, "juvenile court was
never designed for 13-year-olds that pick up a gun and kill a teacher in cold
blood., 50 At a meeting with spiritual and political leaders, just days after the
shooting, Krischer stated that he did not feel he could try Nathaniel as a ju-
venile given the evidence of premeditation. 1 Krischer felt he had little
choice but to try Nathaniel as an adult because the evidence warranted a first-
degree murder indictment.52 From the very beginning, in Krischer's mind,
Nathaniel was guilty of "cold-blooded" or premeditated murder.5 3 Charges
of felony-murder were never discussed by Krischer or other prosecutors
early on in the case. Instead, they insisted that Brazill intended to kill
Grunow1
4
Before the grand jury issued the indictment, Nathaniel's parents im-
plored prosecutors to try their son as a juvenile rather than an adult.5
"We're not saying he shouldn't be punished for what he's done," said Na-
thaniel's father, "[b]ut as a child, not an adult. 5 6 On June 12, 2000, after
hearing testimony and watching a video surveillance tape of the incident,
twenty-one grand jurors indicted Brazill on first-degree murder and aggra-
vated assault. 7 Days later, Nathaniel's attorneys formally entered a not
47. Susan Spencer-Wendel, Brazill's Fate in Jury's Hands; Closing Arguments Take
Nearly All Day, PALM BEACH POST, May 15,2001, at IA, available at 2001 WL 18209138.
48. See Nicole Sterghos Brochu, Boy Will Be Tried as Adult in Slaying; a Grand Jury
Indicted the 13-Year-Old Student in Death of Teacher in Lake; Worth, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft.
Lauderdale), June 13, 2000, at 1A, available at 2000 WL 22179009.
49. Id.
50. Nightline: Crime and Punishment, Should Children Who Commit Crimes Be Tried as
Adults (ABC television broadcast, May 31, 2000), LEXIS-NEXIS, Newsgroup File, Beyond
Two Years [hereinafter Nightline].
51. See Nancy L. Othon, Clerics, Political Leaders Fail to Sway Prosecutor, SUN-
SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), June 9, 2000, at 22A, available at 2000 WL 22178191.
52. See id.
53. See Nightline, supra note 50.
54. See id.
55. See Mel Melendez, Spare Child Adult Penalty, Dad Implores Father in Teacher
Slaying Case Calls for Punishment, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Jun. 2, 2000, at IA,
available at 2000 WL 22176796.
56. Id.
57. Brochu, supra note 48.
[Vol. 28:3:507
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guilty plea for their client, claiming that the shooting was an accident and
that he did not intend to kill Barry Grunow.58
The consequences of trying Nathaniel as an adult were severe. If con-
victed as an adult, he would face life in prison without parole.59 Nathaniel
would spend the years, up to his eighteenth birthday, in a juvenile branch of
the adult prison system.6' Upon reaching age eighteen, he would be trans-
ferred to an adult prison where he would remain without hope of parole. 6
However, if Nathaniel was tried as a juvenile, he would spend his time in a
juvenile detention center focusing on therapy and rehabilitation.6 2 He would
be released on or before his twenty-first birthday.63
The actions of Nathaniel Brazill shocked family, friends, and even
school officials. The thirteen-year-old boy was an honor student at Lake
Worth Middle School.' Teachers, including Barry Grunow, had recom-
mended Nathaniel for the position of peer counselor for the following school
year to help his classmates resolve their problems.65 One neighbor recalled
how Nathaniel would play the flute outside his mother's home. School offi-
cials noted that the boy had perfect attendance.66 In addition, police were
unable to find any evidence that Brazil had planned the school shooting in
advance.67
58. Slaying Suspect Pleads Not Guilty, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), June 20, 2000, at
3B, available at 2000 WL 22180292; see Jon Burnstein, Grunow's Widow at Hearing She Sat
Near Parents of Boy Facing Trial, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Aug. 25, 2000, at 5B,
available at 2000 WL 22192927.
59. Spencer-Wendel, supra note 47.
60. Prior to the Tate case, juveniles convicted as adults for murder served their sentences
in adult prisons. See Brochu, supra note 48. The outcry following the Tate verdict led the
Florida General Assembly to change the law, enabling teenager defendants to start their prison
sentences in juvenile facilities. Amazingly, in the Brazill case, Palm Beach County State
Attorney Barry Kricher did not even know that Brazill would be serving time in adult prison
when he pressed for the indictment. See Nightline, supra note 50. In an interview with Ted
Koppel on ABC's Nightline, Krischer insisted that "there is no facility in the state of Florida
that mixes fifteen-year-olds with adult population." Id.; see also William Raspberry, Rush to
Judgment, WASH. POST, June 15, 2000, at A33, available at 2000 WL 19614572.
61. Adults, Children, Crime, Punishment, CHI. TRIB., June 16, 2000, 2000 WL 3675627.
62. Id.
63. Boy Charged in Teacher's Slaying Protestor's Decry 13-year-old's Indictment as an
Adult, CHI. TRIB., June 13, 2000, available at 2000 WL 3674090.
64. Deborah Sharp, Honor Student Might Be Tried for Murder as Adult 13-Year-Old
Could Face Life in Prison in Slaying of Teacher at Florida School, USA TODAY, May 30,
2000, at 6A, available at 2000 WL 5779538.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Jon Nordheimer, Seventh-Grade Boy Held in Killing of a Teacher, N.Y. TIMES, May
27, 2000, at A8, available at 2000 WL 21821469.
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The .25 caliber Raven Arms pistol that Nathaniel Brazill used to shoot
Barry Grunow belonged to a man characterized as Brazill's surrogate grand-
father, Elmore McCray.68 Just days before the shooting, Brazill spent the
night at the man's home, took the unloaded gun and ammunition from a tin
cookie box in McCray's desk, loaded it, engaged the safety, and hid it in his
overnight bag.69 On the day of the shooting, Brazill took the gun from his
clothes drawer in his room and returned to the school with it.70
Nathaniel Brazill's contention that he did not intend to shoot Barry
Grunow was unwavering. 7' Videotapes of Brazill's interrogation and confes-
sion show that Brazill consistently maintained that the shooting was an acci-
dent.72 This led defense attorney Robert Udell to recommend to the boy and
his family that they reject the plea deal offered by the state about two weeks
before the trial. 73 Under the offer, Brazill would serve twenty-five years in
prison with a possibility of parole after serving twenty-one years.74 He could
have been released by the age of thirty-five.75 The family agreed that reject-
ing the offer was in Nathaniel's best interests. 76
Nathaniel Brazill's trial began on May 2, 2001, a little less than one
year after he shot Barry Grunow on the last day of seventh grade.77 The de-
fense made the decision to have Nathaniel testify on his behalf.78 When
questioned by prosecutors at trial, Nathaniel insisted that he had not meant to
fire the gun, but that the shooting was an accident. 79 "I pulled the trigger, but
68. Nancy L. Othon, Owner Hid Gun in Cookie Box "Gran'Says He Didn't Know It Was
Missing-No Charges Filed Against McCray, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), June 30, 2000,
at 24A, available at 2000 WL 22182355 [hereinafter Othon I]; See generally PrimeTime:
Fatal Attraction; Hidden Camera Experiment Showing How Children and Teens are Irresisti-
ble (sic) Drawn to Guns, Even When They Should Know Better (ABC television broadcast,
Aug. 9, 2001) (showing that children are fascinated by guns and will play with them if they
find them, even if warned just minutes before about the dangers of guns).
69. Othon I, supra note 68.
70. Id.
71. Jon Burstein, Jury Must Decide Brazill's Intent in Teacher's Slaying, SUN-SENTINEL
(Ft. Lauderdale), April 29, 2001, at IA, available at 2001 WL 2674507 [hereinafter Jury Must
Decide].
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Jury Must Decide, supra note 71.
77. Jon Burstein, -jury Seated in Teen 's Murder Case Opening Arguments Begin Today
as Nathaniel Brazill Is Tried in the Death of a Lake Worth Teacher, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft.
Lauderdale), May 2, 2001, at lB, available at 2001 WL 2675063.
78. Jury Must Decide, supra note 71.
79. Teen on Trial: 'I Didn't Try'to Shoot Gun, NEWSDAY, May 10, 2001, at A06, avail-
able at 2001 WL 9230836.
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I didn't try to. That was an accident. Mr. Grunow was one of my friends,"
were the words spoken by Nathaniel at trial.80 Although the teen showed
little emotion during much of his testimony, when asked what Mr. Grunow
did when he collapsed to the ground, Nathaniel replied, "What do you think
he did?" and then began to cry.8'
After less than a two-week trial, the two sides presented their closing
arguments. The prosecution maintained that the killing was intentional, but
added felony-murder to the list of possibilities, presumably to ensure a con-
viction. So when Judge Wennet addressed the jury, his instructions for
first-degree murder included both premeditated murder as well as felony-
murder, as requested by the prosecution. 3 Prior to closing arguments, the
prosecution had made no mention of felony-murder.8 4 A conviction for fel-
ony-murder would have mandated the same life sentence for Brazill as a
conviction for intentionally killing Grunow. 85 For felony-murder, the death
of Grunow had to occur as a consequence of and while Brazill was engaged
in the commission of a burglary.86 Section 810.02 of the Florida Statutes
states that burglary "means entering or remaining in a dwelling, [or] a struc-
ture.., with the intent to commit an offense therein, unless the premises are
at the time open to the public or the defendant is licensed or invited to enter
or remain.'8" On the charge of burglary, "proof of the entering of such struc-
ture... at any time stealthily and without consent of the owner... is prima
facie evidence of entering with intent to commit an offense. 8  The main
issue for the burglary charge was whether Lake Worth Middle School was
open to the public at the time Brazill entered. If it was open to the public,
Brazill would have a complete defense to the charge of burglary. 89 If it was
80. Id.
81. Jon Burstein, Prosecutor: Show How You Held the Gun Brazill Contradicts Testi-
mony, Says Some Witnesses Lied, Then Breaks Down Briefly, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale),
May 10, 2001, at IA, available at 2001 WL 2676788.
82. See Jon Burstein, Brazill's Mother: He's Still a Child-Mom of Teacher's Killer Says
Her Son, 14, Deserves Another Chance in Life, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), May 24,
2001, at I B, available at 2001 WL 2679781.
83. Jon Burstein, Brazill Judge Grants Request of Prosecutors-Brazill Judge Grants
Request of Prosecutors, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), May 11, 2001, at 28A, available at
2001 WL 2676965 [hereinafter Brazill Judge].
84. Jeff Shields, Felony Murder: A Thorny Legal Issue-Jurors Face Point of Law in
Decision, SUN-SENTINEL (FT. LAUDERDALE), May 15, 2001, at 13A, available at 2001 WL
2677716.
85. Brazill Judge, supra note 83.
86. Id.
87. FLA. STAT. § 810.02(i)(a) (2001).
88. § 810.07(i).
89. Brazill Judge, supra note 83.
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not open to the public, then the jury had to find that Brazill intended to
commit aggravated assault with a firearm for him to be guilty of burglary and
therefore felony-murder.9°
After fourteen hours of deliberation, the jury convicted Nathaniel Bra-
zill of second-degree murder and aggravated assault with a firearm.9 One
juror "didn't think the evidence showed [Brazill] had intent to kill Mr.
Grunow. ' 92 Another saw the boy's actions as characteristic of a teenager, not
a cold-blooded killer. 93 According to the juror, the boy just did not see the
consequences of his actions.94
Initially, there was speculation about the sentence that Brazill could re-
ceive, but Judge Wennet found that Florida law did not offer him any leeway
in deciding Brazill's sentence. 95 Florida's "10-20-Life" gun violence law
mandates that anyone convicted of killing someone with a gun be sentenced
to no less than twenty-five years in prison.96 Wennet did not agree with the
defense that the law did not apply to children under sixteen.97 Instead, the
judge decided that since Brazill was tried as an adult, he had to be sentenced
as one.98 Prosecutor Marc Shiner asked for life without parole, stating,
90. Jury Instructions at 4-6, Florida v. Brazill, No. 00-6385CF A02 (Fla. 2001).
91. Mitch Lipka & Stella M. Chavez, Brazill Guilty, 14-Year-Old Convicted of Second-
Degree Murder, Jurors Weren 't Convinced of Intent to Kill, Jurors Initially Leaned 7-5 To-
ward First-Degree Verdict, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), May 17, 2001, at 1 A, available at
2001 WL 2678206. Even though the jury found Brazill guilty of aggravated assault with a
firearm, that offense is not one of the specifically enumerated felonies for which a defendant
can be guilty of felony-murder in Florida. See § 782.04(1)(a)(2)(a)(p).
92. Lipka & Chavez, supra note 91.
93. Id.
94. Id. One commentator, Paul Thompson, a neurologist at UCLA, believes that Bra-
zill's verdict of second-degree murder is consistent with scientific research. Paul Thompson,
Editorial, Brain Research Shows a Child Is Not an Adult, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale),
May 25, 2001, at 31A, available at 2001 WL 2680069. Thompson cites his own research that
has revealed that the teenage brain is not equipped to deal with risky impulses, which may
explain why Brazill claimed he made a mistake in shooting Grunow. Id. According to
Thompson, the verdict is in line with scientific research in that Brazill's actions were not
accidental but they were not completely thought-out either. See also Marty Beyer, Immatur-
ity, Culpability & Competency in Juveniles: A Study of 17 Cases, 15 SUM. CRIM. JUST. 26
(2000) (adolescents often view the consequences of their actions as "accidental" when adults
would have foreseen the consequences).
95. Jon Burstein & Shana Gruskin, Judge Backs Off Life Term for Teen, Nathaniel Bra-
zill Received 28 Years in Prison for Killing Barry Grunow, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 28,
2001, at C 1, available at 2001 WL 9199512.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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"[t]hat's the only way we can be sure [Brazill] won't hurt someone again." 99
On July 27, 2001, Judge Wennet sentenced Nathaniel Brazill to twenty-eight
years in prison without parole.' ° Nathaniel Brazill is currently housed in a
youthful offender prison, and he will remain there until he is at least eight-
een, at which point he will enter the adult prison system."'
Although both the Brazill and Tate trials are over and both defendants
have begun serving their sentences, the debate over whether either should
ever have been in an adult courtroom still rages. After the verdict was an-
nounced, Governor Jeb Bush expressed his dismay that Brazill was tried as
an adult. "There is a different standard for children," the Florida governor
said. "There should be a sensitivity to the fact that a 14-year-old is not a
little adult."' 2 One juror also felt that the young boy's case should not have
come before an adult court. "Knowing what I know now," said one juror, "I
would say he should have been tried as a juvenile. He was a juvenile."'0 3
Although the debate still rages concerning the appropriateness of trying and
sentencing teenagers as adults, there is little or no debate about the prosecu-
torial practice, as in the Tate and Brazill cases, of using the felony-murder
doctrine to make it easier to convict juveniles as adults."° The use of the
felony-murder rule in the Brazill case was a stretch. It is hard to imagine that
thirteen-year-old Brazill thought his public school was "private property,"
especially during school hours. Nor is it likely that Florida legislators envi-
sioned that the burglary statute would apply to Brazill's actions. 0 5
A Florida appellate court affirmed Brazill's conviction and sentence,
finding that the broad discretion accorded to the prosecutor under the Florida
legal system to seek indictment for a felony or allow a case to go to juvenile
court did not violate the Constitution.0 6 Describing a prosecutor's discretion
in deciding whether and how to prosecute as "absolute," the court noted the
99. Amanda Riddle, Fourteen-year-old Boy in Florida Gets 28 Years in Prison for Kill-
ing His Teacher, SAVANNAH MORNING NEWS, July, 28, 2001, http://www.savannahnow.com/
stories/072801/LOCkillerap.shtml (last visited Apr. 8, 2004).
100. Glenda Cooper, Florida Teen Gets 28 Years in Teacher's Shooting Death, WASH.
POST, July 28, 2001, at A03, available at 2001 WL 23183295.
101. Burstein & Gruskin, supra note 95.
102. Boy is Guilty of Second-Degree Murder in the Shooting of a Teacher in Florida, 14-
year-old Says He Meant Only to Scare Victim, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, May 17, 2001, at
A2, available at 2001 WL 4462045.
103. Lipka & Chavez, supra note 91.
104. An extensive review of newspaper articles and law review articles reveals that very
little has been written about the appropriateness of applying the felony-murder doctrine to
children.
105. See Steven A. Drizin, Rule Should Not Apply to Children, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauder-
dale), May 14, 2001, at 19A, available at 2001 WL 2677645.
106. Brazill v. State, 845 So. 2d 282, 289 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
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requirement that children thirteen and under may be prosecuted in adult court
only by indictment of a grand jury actually serves to protect children against
abuses of prosecutorial discretion because it requires grand jurors to concur
with prosecutorial charging decisions.10 7 Accordingly, the court held that
Florida's statutory scheme for prosecuting juveniles as adults did not violate
Brazill's equal protection or due process fights, or the separation of pow-
ers." 8 Although the court was not faced with an attack on the prosecutor's
decision to use the felony-murder rule to obtain a conviction against Brazill,
its ringing endorsement of prosecutorial discretion does not bode well for
such future challenges.
C. Jonathan Miller
Thirteen-year-old Josh Belluardo died on November 4, 1998, after
spending nearly forty-eight hours in a coma."' 9 The parents of the middle-
schooler made the difficult choice of taking their brain dead son off of life
support."' Josh ended up in the hospital after he was hit in the back of the
head, kicked in the stomach, and hit in the face by fifteen-year-old Jonathan
Miller."' On the afternoon of November 2, 1998, Josh spent the bus ride
home from school being taunted and bullied by Jonathan." 2 He had pencils
and paper wads thrown at him as the two rode home from their respective
schools. 13 Josh was in the eighth grade at E.T. Booth Middle School and
Jonathan was in high school." 4 When Josh got off the bus and began to walk
toward his home in a quiet, middle-class town in Cherokee County, Georgia,
Jonathan followed and laid the would be fatal blows on Josh." 5 Josh's sister
ran to him and held him in her arms.' 16 A neighbor raced over to help and
saw that Josh was unresponsive and called the paramedics. 17 Jonathan ran
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Mark Bixler & Glenn Hannigan, Cherokee Residents Mourn Loss of Teen, Student
Accused of Beating 13-Year-Old After School May Be Charged with Murder Today, ATLANTA
J. & CONST., Nov. 5, 1998, at F01, available at 1998 WL 3724745; see Mark Bixler, Teen
faces adult trial in death, 15-year-old suspect held without bail after comatose beating victim,
13, dies, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Nov. 6, 1998, at IC, available at 1998 WL 3724863 [herein-
after Teen Faces Adult Trial].
110. Teen Faces Adult Trial, supra note 109.
111. Bixler & Hannigan, supra note 109.
112. See id.
113. Id.; Teen Faces Adult Trial, supra note 109.
114. Teen Faces Adult Trial, supra note 109.
115. Bixler & Hannigan, supra note 109.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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with a friend to his home a few yards from the incident. 18 Jonathan and Josh
had been neighbors for years. Jonathan lived across a cul-de-sac from
Josh."19
Initially, police charged Jonathan as a juvenile for aggravated battery.'2 °
Upon Josh's death, however, Jonathan was charged with murder, and Chero-
kee County prosecutors sought to transfer him from juvenile to adult court.'2'
On November 5, 1998, Jonathan appeared before Superior Court Judge
Frank C. Mills, III, and was formally charged with murder as an adult.
121
The judge ordered Jonathan held without bail, but Jonathan's lawyer, Mi-
chael B. Syrop, filed a motion asking that bond be set so that Jonathan could
be out of custody until the case is resolved. 23 That issue was not immedi-
ately resolved. 124 In addition, the judge granted the lawyer's request that
video cameras be removed from the courtroom because there had been
threats on the teenager's life and this constituted a special situation under the
Georgia law.
2 5
From the beginning, classmates, their parents, and the media character-
ized Jonathan as a bully, saying that he called people "faggots," teased
classmates, and was generally a mean-spirited person. 26 However, Jona-
than's attorney disputed the description and said that his client "didn't come
across to [him] as the demon he's being portrayed as."'' 27 In response to the
incident, a Georgia state representative, Chuck Scheid, introduced a bill tar-
geted at bullies.'28 The bill would require schools, both public and private, to
post the law in their classrooms and require school officials to "notify police
and the parents of all students involved in a complaint of bullying."'
12 9
Representative Scheid believed that schools protect bullies and that their
conduct often goes unmentioned to parents and police. 30
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Bixler & Hannigan, supra note 109.
121. Id.
122. Teen Faces Adult Trial, supra note 109.
123. Id.
124. See Mark Bixier, Teen's Case Highlights Issue of Bond for Murder Defendants,
ATLANTA J. & CONST., Dec. 10, 1998, at 9JQ, available at 1998 WL 3730954 [hereinafter
Teen's Case Highlights Issue].
125. See id.
126. Id.
127. Bixler & Hannigan, supra note 109.
128. Mark Bixler, E.T. Booth Focuses on Memorials, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Nov. 19,
1998, at 12JH, available at 1998 WL 3727109.
129. Id.
130. See id.
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Jonathan Miller's lawyer successfully argued that the fifteen-year-old
should be released on bond while he awaited trial.131  Judge C. Michael
Roach set bond at $50,000 and placed a series of conditions on Jonathan
while on bond, despite protests from the murder victim's family.' 32 These
conditions, stipulated to by Miller, were that he had to live at least fifteen
miles from his neighborhood where the incident occurred, wear a monitoring
device, and not contact any witnesses.
33
On December 14, 1998, prosecutors proceeded to indict Miller for first-
degree murder. 34 Unlike the prosecutors in the Tate and Brazill cases, the
Georgia prosecutors used Georgia's felony-murder law from the outset to get
a first-degree murder indictment from the grand jury.'35 The underlying
felonies cited by the prosecution were aggravated assault and aggravated
battery. 136 So, in Georgia, in order to obtain a first-degree murder convic-
tion, prosecutors only needed to convince jurors that Jonathan was guilty of
aggravated assault.137 The indictment said that Miller committed aggravated
assault when he hit Josh with his hands and feet "about the head and
body.' ' 3
8
Only a few weeks after being released on bond and then indicted for
first-degree felony murder, Judge C. Michael Roach ordered Jonathan Miller
back to jail after the boy hosted a slumber party for several friends expected
to testify against him. 139 The party was a direct violation of the bond agree-
131. Teen's Case Highlights Issue, supra note 124.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Mark Bixler, Felony Murder Law Used in Cherokee Rule Allows Charge, Regardless
of Intent, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Dec. 16, 1998, at 2C, available at 1998 WL 3731847 [here-
inafter Felony Murder Law Used in Cherokee].
135. See id.
136. Id. Although most states do not allow aggravated assault as the predicate felony,
Georgia is an exception. In general, most states rely on some form of "independent felony" or
"merger limitation" when employing the felony-murder rule. Under the limitation, felonious
assault, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter are not eligible for use as the
predicate felony. The rationale is that without this limitation, almost every felonious assault,
voluntary manslaughter, or involuntary manslaughter could be turned into a felony-murder
and the need for the distinction of a separate offense would be unnecessary.
137. See Bixler & Hannigan, supra note 109.
138. Felony Murder Law Used in Cherokee, supra note 134.
139. Teen Back in Jail on Violation in Fatal Ga. Beating, CHATrANOOGA TIMES FREE
PRESS, Feb. 7, 1999, at B8.
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ment. 4° Subsequently, a "flamboyant" Atlanta attorney, Bruce Harvey,
joined the Jonathan Miller defense team. 141
Jonathan Miller's trial date was set for April 26, 1999. On April 20,
1999, just days before the trial was to begin, two boys, Dylan Klebold, age
seventeen, and Eric Harris, age eighteen, opened fire on classmates at Col-
umbine High School in Littleton, Colorado. The two boys killed twelve stu-
dents and a teacher and wounded over twenty before turning the guns on
themselves. 141 In light of the events at Columbine, Miller's attorneys tried
unsuccessfully to get the trial delayed citing public concern over school vio-
lence following the Columbine murders as potentially influencing the july. 43
However, Judge Roach denied the request and began jury selection immedi-
ately.' 44
The jury selection for Miller's trial took longer than anticipated given
the Columbine incident and intense media coverage of that case. 145 Defense
attorneys continuously argued that Miller could not receive a fair trial in the
Atlanta metro area because of the media's characterization of the beating and
their client, and the media's attempt to link the case to the Columbine case. 146
However, these arguments fell on deaf ears. 147 The prosecution's witnesses
were heard on May 5, 1999.148 The defense maintained that Jonathan did not
intend to kill Josh Belluardo, and that the teen was only guilty of involuntary
manslaughter, not felony-murder as the prosecution claimed. 49 The prosecu-
tion continued to insist that Jonathan was guilty of aggravated assault or ag-
gravated battery, and that under Georgia's felony-murder law, he should be
140. Id.
141. Mark Bixler, Youth getting famed lawyer, Cherokee teenager accused in fatal beating
will be represented by Bruce Harvey, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Apr. 8, 1999, at 2D, available at
1999 WL 3761120.
142. See Angie Cannon et al., Why? There were plenty of warnings, but no one stopped
two twisted teens, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, May 3, 1999, at 16; Nancy Gibbs, In Sorrow
and Disbelief, TIME, May 3, 1999, at 20.
143. Judge Rejects Delay of Bus Stop Beating Trial, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS,
Apr. 27, 1999, at B2.
144. Id.
145. Mark Bixler, Youth Trial Moving Slower Than Normal, ATLANTA J. & CONST., May
1, 1999, at Fl, available at 1999 WL 3767365.
146. See id.
147. Id.
148. Mark Bixler, Victim's Sister Testifies in Teen's Trial: There was no Response When
Katie Belluardo Went to Help Her Brother After He Was Punched, She Says, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., May 6, 1999, at B 1, available at 1999 WL 3768690 [hereinafter Victim's Sister Testi-
fies in Teen 's Trial].
149. Id.
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convicted of first-degree murder. 5° Meanwhile, defense attorney Bruce
Harvey argued that the attack was only a misdemeanor assault or battery, and
that under Georgia law, Miller was guilty of involuntary manslaughter if he
were found to have committed a misdemeanor that unintentionally leads to
death.' 51
Jonathan Miller's trial lasted just three days. 52 The victim's sister took
the stand and testified that she saw her brother on the grass outside their
home, ran out to him, saw him gasp for air, and watched his face turn from
red to purple to blue.'53 Others testified that Miller had taunted the victim
often in the days preceding the attack. 54 Medical experts said that a torn
artery in Josh's brain was the actual cause of the death.'55 The small tear in
the artery allowed the brain cavity to fill with blood and leave the teenager
brain dead.'56 After the prosecution finished presenting its case, the defense
made the surprise announcement that it would not present any evidence or
call any witnesses.15
After only six hours of deliberation, the jury found Jonathan Miller
guilty of felony-murder, aggravated assault, and aggravated battery.'58 The
conviction meant an automatic life sentence for the teenager with the possi-
bility of parole after fourteen years.'59 However, the judge could decide to
impose a longer sentence for the aggravated assault and battery charges. 6°
Following the verdict, attorneys for Jonathan Miller vowed to appeal on the
basis of Judge Roach's denial to delay the trial until after the panic over the
Columbine shootings had died down. 161
150. Id.
151. Id. The "misdemeanor-manslaughter" rule permits conviction of involuntary man-
slaughter for an accidental homicide that occurs during the commission of an unlawful act not
amounting to a felony (a dangerous misdemeanor) without the required showing that the de-
fendant intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently caused the death. JOSHUA
DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 31.09, at 538 (3d ed. 2001).
152. Boy Convicted in Killing Cites Littleton in Appeal, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1999, at 17.
153. Victim's Sister Testifies in Teen's Trial, supra note 148.
154. Id.
155. Mark Bixler, Cherokee teen found guilty of murder, ATLANTA J. & CONST., May 8,
1999, at Al, available at 1999 WL 3769128 [hereinafter Cherokee teen found guilty].
156. Id.
157. Mark Bixler, Cherokee Bully Case Goes to Jury Teen-On-Teen Crime: 15-Year-Old
Facing Felony Murder or Involuntary Manslaughter Sentence in Neighbor's Death, ATLANTA
J. & CONST., May 7, 1999, at D1, available at 1999 WL 3768950 [hereinafter Cherokee bully
case].
158. Cherokee Teen Found Guilty, supra note 155.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Boy Convicted in Killing Cites Littleton in Appeal, supra note 152.
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One juror said that the jury had no choice but to convict Miller.,6 2 Ac-
cording to the juror, Assistant District Attorney Rachelle L. Carnesale had
proved the definitions of the charges against Miller, and the defense did little
to rebut them when it failed to call any witnesses. 63 According to the juror,
the most difficult part of the conviction was whether Miller was guilty of
aggravated battery." Under Georgia law, to be guilty of aggravated battery,
the victim has to be deprived of the use of one of his body parts, in this case
his brain.'65 The jury had trouble deciding whether Josh died instantaneously
or not. 166 In the end, the jury decided that the young boy did not die instantly
given the victim's sister's testimony that she found her brother gasping for
air. 167
Judge Roach sentenced Miller to life in prison on May 21, 1999.168 The
judge said that he had no choice because Georgia law required a life sentence
for a felony-murder conviction. 69 If Jonathan had been convicted of invol-
untary manslaughter, as the defense argued, his sentence would have been
one to ten years in prison.
70
As in the Brazill case, some in the community argued that Miller should
have been tried in juvenile court. 7 ' "They can try him as an adult, but the
reality is he's a kid.... Life in prison to me is going way too far," said Rick
McDevitt, president of the Georgia Alliance for Children. 7 2 Following the
sentencing, Miller's attorneys said they would appeal the sentence because
the punishment was cruel for a death that was unintended. '71 Months after
162. Ben Schmitt, Cherokee Juror: Defense Didn't Give Us Much Choice, FULTON
COUNTY DAILY REPORT, May 11, 1999 available at .LEXIS, Nexis Library, Fulton File.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-24(a) (2003).
166. See generally Patrick v. State, 274 S.E.2d 570 (Ga. 1981). If a victim dies instanta-
neously, the defendant cannot be subjected to aggravated battery. Id. at 572. On appeal,
Miller's attorneys argued, among other things, that Josh Belluardo died instantaneously when
he was hit, and therefore Jonathan could not have been guilty of aggravated battery. See Ap-
pellant's Brief in Support of His Appeal, Miller v. State, 571 S.E.2d 788 (Ga. 2002) (No.
S02A0626); Appellant's Supplemental Brief in Support of His Appeal, Miller v. State, 571
S.E.2d 778 (Ga. 2002) (No. S02A0626).
167. Schmitt, supra note 162.
168. Id.
169. Boy, 15, Gets Life in Bus Stop Killing, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS, May 22,
1999, at B5.
170. Mark Bixler, Teen Gets Life in Bus Stop Beating Death, ATLANTA J. & CONST., May
22, 1999, at Gl, available at 1999 WL 3772782.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Appeal Planned of Life Sentence in Killing at Bus Stop, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE
PRESS, May 24, 1999, at B8.
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being sentenced to life in prison, Jonathan Miller told reporters, "I'm not a
murder - I shouldn't - I don't see myself as a murderer... I'm a good kid,
but I just made a few mistakes in my life.' 174
On May 2, 2002, Jonathan Miller's lawyers asked the Supreme Court of
Georgia to reverse the conviction and grant the boy a new trial. 175 Miller
raised several issues relating to the felony-murder doctrine, including
whether Georgia's statutory scheme for trying juveniles as adults, which
gives original jurisdiction to the criminal court over all thirteen to seventeen-
year-olds charged with murder, applies to felony-murder cases, and whether
it is proper to use aggravated assault to win a felony-murder conviction when
life is lost unintentionally. 76 On October 28, 2002, the Supreme Court of
Georgia rejected all of Jonathan's arguments and affirmed his conviction and
sentence. 177 Although he concurred in the judgment, Justice Benham felt
compelled to write a separate opinion in which he questioned the result:
While I concur in the majority opinion, I cannot help but believe
that as we treat more and more children as adults and impose
harsher and harsher punishment, the day will soon come when we
look back on these cases as representing a regrettable era in our
criminal justice system. As we were developing our juvenile jus-
tice system, we sought to treat children differently from adults be-
cause we recognized they had not developed the problem-solving
skills of adults. We now lump certain children in the same cate-
gory as adults and mete out harsh punishment to them, ignoring
the differences between childhood and adulthood.
178
In the cases discussed above, most of the debate focused on the issue of
whether the boys should have been tried as juveniles or adults. 179 In the Flor-
ida cases, there was little or no debate about the appropriateness of using the
felony-murder rule to gain first-degree murder convictions against Brazill
and Tate once these boys were prosecuted in adult court. 80 Although the use
of the felony-murder rule was questioned by the lawyers in the Miller case,
the attacks were premised on the propriety of using felony-murder as a
174. They Called it Murder; Border Crossing (CNN & TIME television broadcast, Sept. 19,
1999), available at LEXIS, News, CNN Transcripts.
175. D. Aileen Dodd, Appeal Sought in Boy's '98 Punching Death, ATLANTA J. & CONST.,
May 2, 2002, at D12, available at 2002 WL 3720956.
176. See id.; GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-28(b)(2)(A)(i) (2001).
177. Miller v. State, 571 S.E.2d 788, 798 (Ga. 2002).
178. Id. at 798-99 (Benham, J., concurring).
179. See id.; Brazill v. State, 845 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
180. See supra Part I.A-B.
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predicate for transferring a juvenile to adult court, and the propriety of using
aggravated assault or battery as a predicate for felony-murder, rather than a
more broad-based attack on the appropriateness of using the felony-murder
rule on teenage defendants. In the sections that follow, we will argue that the
historical and doctrinal underpinnings of the felony-murder rule make little
sense in the case of children and teenagers, and that old and new understand-
ings of developmental differences between children and adults also make
application of the felony-murder rule problematic in the cases involving
child-defendants.
III. FELONY-MURDER RULE & TEENAGERS
(HISTORY/SUMMARY/RATIONALE)
In cases like those of Lionel Tate, Nathaniel Brazill, and Jonathan
Miller, the felony-murder rule imposes liability for murder when death re-
sults from actions taken during the commission or attempted commission of
a felony. The rule applies in all situations-when the felon kills intention-
ally, recklessly, or accidentally. This rule allows prosecutors to charge a
defendant with murder, even if the defendant did not intend to kill the victim.
Prosecutors must only prove that the defendant intended to commit the un-
derlying felony, and are not required to offer any separate proof of intent
with regard to the death.
In response to criticism of the felony-murder rule, supporters of the rule
offer deterrence, reaffirming the sanctity of human life, and easing the prose-
cutor's burden of proof as rationales for the rule.'8 ' The most commonly
cited defense of the felony-murder rule is deterrence, the hope of preventing
negligent and accidental killings during the commission of felonies. 182 The
rule can also be viewed as reaffirming the sanctity of human life in that it
reflects the view of society that a felony resulting in death is more serious
than one that does not and, therefore, deserves greater punishment.
83
Finally, although not an explicit justification for the rule, easing the
prosecutor's burden of proof is often the result because prosecutors can con-
vict on a lesser level of intent than that required for murder. 84 Although
these are the primary justifications for the rule, one commentator views them
as mere pretenses. To LaFave, the most likely rationale behind the felony-
murder rule is perhaps more retributive in nature: "that the defendant, be-
cause he is committing a felony, is by hypothesis a bad person, so that we
181. DRESSLER, supra note 151, § 31.01, at 516-19.
182. Id.
183. Id. § 31.01, at 517.
184. Seeid.§31.01,at518.
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should not worry too much about the difference between the bad results he
intends and the bad results he brings about." '85
The felony-murder rule is a much-condemned doctrine. In 1834, His
Majesty's Commission on Criminal Law found the felony-murder rule "'to-
tally incongruous with the general principles of our jurisprudence." 186
"Principled argument in favor of the felony-murder doctrine is hard to
find.' 1 7 In addition, the "ancient rule ... has been bombarded by intense
criticism and constitutional attack."'188 Moreover, "[c]riticism of the rule
constitutes a lexicon of everything that scholars and jurists can find wrong
with a legal doctrine."' 189 Such criticism led England to abolish the felony-
murder rule by statute in 1957.190 In the United States, although few states
have abolished the felony-murder rule, others have limited its scope, but by
and large the felony-murder rule still thrives in most jurisdictions. 9'
The felony-murder rule, which is codified in several states, cannot be
traced to one clear source. In some instances, scholars have traced the first
formal statement of the rule to Lord Dacre's Case, 1558.192 In Lord Dacre's
Case, Lord Dacre and some companions were hunting in a park, an unlawful
act, and agreed to kill anyone who might resist them.'93 One member of the
hunting party killed a gamekeeper who confronted him. ' 94 Although not
present during the confrontation, Lord Dacre and all the members of the
party were convicted of murder and hanged. 9' Although accepted by many
as an example of the felony-murder rule, some legal scholars believe the case
is an early example of placing liability on the companions on a theory of
constructive presence, or because the group had earlier agreed to the crime
185. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 7.5, at 682 (3d ed. 2000).
186. People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 319 (Mich. 1980).
187. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. at 37 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
188. State v. Maldonado, 645 A.2d 1165, 1171 (N.J. 1994) (citing Aaron, 299 N.W.2d at
327-29).
189. Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony-Murder Rule: A Doctrine of Consti-
tutional Crossroads, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 446 (1985).
190. See id. at n.12.
191. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 701 (1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.020 (Michie 1999);
Aaron, 299 N.W.2d at 321 (interpreting a Michigan statute where the rule is no longer recog-
nized by statute). While in New Mexico, the state supreme court has effectively obliterated
the rule by imposing a mens rea requirement for felony-murder. See State v. Ortega, 817 P.2d
1196, 1204 (N.M. 1991).
192. See Norval Morris, The Felon's Responsibility for the Lethal Acts of Others, 105 U.
PA. L. REV. 50, 58 (1956).
193. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d at 307.
194. Id. at 308.
195. Id.
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and therefore had a shared mens rea.96 Nevertheless, the case is the most
often cited source of the felony-murder rule, although some scholars cite
later sources such as Edward Coke, 1644,'9' or Sir Michael Foster, 1762, as
promulgating the rule that a killing during a felony would automatically be-
come a murder.' 98 By 1769, the felony-murder rule was simply stated by
William Blackstone: one who caused a death in the commission or at-
tempted commission of any felony is guilty of murder.' 99 In any case, the
felony-murder rule can be traced back to the 1700s. As far back as the his-
tory of the rule can be traced, so can one trace condemnation of it.
A much criticized rule when applied to adults, the felony-murder rule is
even more problematic when applied to children under the age of fourteen.
Under the common law, such children are presumed to be incapable of form-
ing criminal intent.00 The common law infancy defense can be stated as
"children under the age of seven are conclusively presumed to be without
criminal capacity, those who have reached the age of fourteen are treated as
fully responsible, while as to those between the ages of seven and fourteen
there is a rebuttable presumption of criminal incapacity.'2'2°  The infancy
defense reflects the law's "unwillingness to punish those thought to be inca-
pable of forming criminal intent. '20 2 According to one scholar, "[t]he in-
fancy defense was an essential component of the common law limitation of
punishment to the blameworthy.,
20 3
This common law "infancy defense" dates back to the tenth century,
when it was established by statute that no one under the age of fifteen could
be subjected to capital punishment unless he attempted to escape or refused
to give himself up.2°3 "[B]y the beginning of the fourteenth century, it was
established that children under the age of seven were without criminal capac-
ity.' 5 By 1338, children over the age of seven were presumed to lack the
capacity to commit a crime, however this could be rebutted by proof of mal-
196. See People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 308 (Mich. 1980).
197. See James W. Hilliard, Felony Murder in Illinois-The "Agency Theory" vs. the
"Proximate Cause Theory": The Debate Continues, 25 S. ILL. U. L.J. 331, 332 (2001).
198. James J. Tomkovicz, The Endurance of the Felony-Murder Rule: A Study of the
Forces That Shape Our Criminal Law, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1429, 1442 (1994).
199. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 200-01 (1769).
200. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 4.11, at 398 (2d ed.
1986); see ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 938 (3d ed. 1982).
201. LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 200.
202. In re Devon T., 584 A.2d 1287, 1290 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991).
203. Andrew Walkover, The Infancy Defense in the New Juvenile Court, 31 UCLA L.
REV. 503, 507 (1984).
204. LAFAVE, supra note 185, § 4.11, at 424-25.
205. Id. § 4.11, at 425.
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ice.216 It was firmly established by the seventeenth century that the presump-
tion of incapacity operated until a child was fourteen years old.2°7 Before the
state could gain a conviction against a child, it had the burden of overcoming
the presumption of incapacity. 20 8
With the emergence of the juvenile court system it seemed that the in-
fancy defense would become unnecessary. The juvenile court system acted
as parens patriae, and the state became the punisher, substituting itself for
the parents. The need to establish moral blameworthiness and, hence, the
defense that it does not exist vanished.2 9 Indeed, many courts, citing the
non-adversarial and non-punitive purposes of the juvenile courts, held that
the infancy defense was unavailable to children tried in juvenile court."(0
However, the juvenile justice system has undergone considerable change
over time and is becoming much more like a penal court. This trend, first
noted by the United States Supreme Court in In re Gault2l' and In re Win-
ship,2t 2 has only accelerated in the last decade as more and more juveniles
are being tried in adult courtrooms.2 13 In short, the infancy defense was once
very important in protecting the child who faced criminal prosecution. How-
ever, the defense became less important in the early years of the juvenile
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. See id. According to LaFave, the prosecutor's burden was a heavy one, sometimes
stated to be "beyond a reasonable doubt" and sometimes "clear and convincing evidence."
LAFAVE, supra note 185, § 4.11, at 425.
209. See Devon T., 584 A.2d at 1291. Some have argued that In re Gault and In re Win-
ship, by bestowing upon juvenile defendants almost all of the same due process rights as
adults, may have laid the foundation for the recent increase in laws permitting adult prosecu-
tion of juveniles. See, e.g., HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, NAT'L CTR FOR
JUVENILE JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 1999 NATIONAL REPORT 89 (1999),
available at http://ncjrs.org/html/ojjdp/nationalreport99/toc.html. See generally Martin L.
Forst & Martha-Elin Blomquist, Cracking Down on Juveniles: The Changing Ideology of
Youth Corrections, 5 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 323, 361-71 (1991). If juve-
niles are capable of exercising these "rights" as adults, or so the argument goes, then they
should be held accountable as adults when convicted. Id.
210. See, e.g., State v. D.H., 340 So. 2d 1163, 1166 (Fla. 1976); In re Davis, 299 A.2d
856, 860 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1973); In re Robert M., 441 N.Y.S.2d 860, 863 (Fam. Ct. 1981).
211. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
212. 397 U.S. 358 (1969).
213. A 1998 Department of Justice study showed that almost 200,000 children under the
age of eighteen are prosecuted in criminal court each year. See MACOLM C. YOUNG & JENNI
GAINSBOROUGH, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, PROSECUTING JUVENILES IN ADULT COURT: AN
ASSESSMENT OF TRENDS AND CONSEQUENCES 5 (2000), available at http://www.sentencing
project.org/pubs/2079.pdf. In addition, between 1992 and 1997, forty-seven states passed
laws to make it easier to prosecute children as adult. See Snyder & Sickmund, supra note
209.
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justice system; only recently has it gained relevance again as more and more
juveniles are tried as adults.
A closer look at the justifications for the doctrine of incapacity and the
felony-murder rule confirms that the felony-murder rule was not intended to
be applied to children under the age of fourteen. The early common law
infancy defense was based upon an unwillingness to punish those thought to
be incapable of forming criminal intent, and not of an age where the threat of
punishment would serve as a deterrent." 4 The felony-murder rule, in con-
trast, was justified as a deterrent for negligent and accidental killings during
the commission of a felony,2 5 or as means to punish those who do bad things
generally."1 6
In light of the presumption that children under age fourteen are incapa-
ble of forming criminal intent, the deterrence rationale makes no sense if
applied to children. As for punishing those who do bad things, the juvenile
justice system was designed to deal with the special needs of child defen-
dants while still punishing them. Applying the felony-murder rule to chil-
dren under the age of fourteen also produces unfair and nonsensical out-
comes. By relieving prosecutors of the burden of rebutting the presumption
of incapacity through proof of premeditation or malice, courts essentially
would be permitting murder convictions of child-defendants who are pre-
sumed incapable of forming criminal intent. It is inconsistent with common
law to make it easier for prosecutors to obtain a murder conviction in the
case of youthful defendants, when the objective of the presumption of inca-
pacity is just the opposite-to make it harder to prove intent when the defen-
dant is a child.
Finally, the doctrine of incapacity must surely trump the felony-murder
rule since "capacity" is a necessary foundation for the formation of "intent"
in the culpability, or mens rea, context of a felony.
Put simply, mens rea is the state of mind required to commit a
blameworthy act. The concept of legal responsibility, or the ca-
pacity to have a culpable state of mind, overlaps, in part, with
mens rea. Unless an accused has the capacity to be culpable, it is
impossible for him to maintain the specific mental state, or mens
rea, required for commission of a criminal offense. Legal respon-
sibility may also be viewed as a fundamental pre-requisite to the
existence of mens rea. The mens rea inquiry focuses on whether
the accused, when assumed capable of complying with the law's
214. LAFAVE, supra note 185, § 7.5, at 425.
215. See DRESSLER, supra note 151.
216. See LAFAVE, supra note 185, § 7.5, at 671.
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command, possessed the specific state of mind required to con-
sider an act blameworthy. Legal responsibility focuses instead on
the question of whether the accused's deficiencies of judgment dis-
tinguish him from others in society such that we do not expect him
to comply with the law ... Legal responsibility and mens rea also
differ in terms of the time frame in which the court analyzes the
problem of culpability. The mens rea inquiry focuses on the time
period in which the harmful act was committed. Proof of the ca-
pacity to be legally responsible for one's acts focuses on the life
experience of the individual. By widening the time frame, legal
responsibility differences allow the court to explore a broader
range of behavior that might exculpate the accused.217
In other words, capacity is the prerequisite for mens rea. In order for
prosecutors to prove mens rea, they must first prove that the defendant was
capable of forming criminal intent. But, especially when dealing with a
child, this inquiry is much broader in scope than a traditional mens rea
analysis and necessarily involves consideration of developmental factors
which bear on a child's ability to form intent-factors which are incompati-
ble with the felony-murder rule. It is to these developmental factors in which
we now turn.
IV. PSYCHOSOCIAL RESEARCH & BRAIN RESEARCH
Courts applying the infancy defense typically focus on the child's ca-
pacity to understand the nature and consequences of his acts, and the ability
to distinguish right from wrong.218 Given current understandings about the
moral development of children and psychosocial literature on the compe-
tence and decision-making of teens, courts exploring the infancy defense
must also inquire into the degree of impulse control that the youth is capable
of exercising."1 9 Recent research showing that adolescent brains are less
developed than adult brains in the very areas of the brain that govern impulse
control and judgment-the prefrontal lobes-provides added weight to the
need for courts to factor impulse control into the traditional infancy analy-
sis.2
20
217. Walkover, supra note 203, at 537-38 (emphasis added).
218. See id. at 512.
219. Id. at 560; see Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., Juvenile Justice: Rebirth of the Infancy De-
fense, 12 CRIM. JUST. 45, 46 (1997).
220. See, e.g., 3 HANDBOOK OF CHILD AND ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 15, 37 (Lois T.
Flaherty & Richard M. Sarles eds., 1997).
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Although research on the development of the teenage brain in compari-
son to the adult brain is still in its infancy, recent studies have focused on the
cognitive and psychosocial factors of adolescent development. Early studies
concentrated on decision-making and cognitive aspects of development, and
looked at teenagers' ability to reason, comprehend, "and appreciate decisions
as adults would." '221 These studies were initiated in response to the legal
changes surrounding medical decision-making and informed consent by
young people.2 22 Therefore, the findings, although helpful, do not answer all
questions regarding teenage development. Instead, the studies show that
teenagers, especially from age fifteen on, are not that much different than
adults. 223 However, criticism of the early studies reveals methodological
flaws such as small, unrepresentative samples of mostly white, middle class
subjects.224 A study of Miranda waivers by Thomas Grisso supports the con-
tention that teenagers over fifteen are capable of understanding their
Miranda rights as well as adults.225 However, Grisso stressed that the under-
standing of Miranda rights is only consistent when the teenagers and adults
are of comparably average intelligence.226 When compared to adults with a
similarly low I.Q., teenagers with a lower intelligence did not possess an
equivalent understanding of their rights.227
Youth advocates used the cognitive similarities of adults and older teen-
agers professed by these studies to support an expansion of adolescent
autonomy in the medical context for teenagers, especially to consent to abor-
tion.228 However, these studies were used years later to attack the juvenile
justice system and argue in support of teenagers being tried as adults in
criminal courts.2 29 The argument was that if teenagers could make autono-
mous healthcare decisions, then they were equally capable of being tried as
adults and making legal decisions.23 0 The juvenile justice system was based
on the idea that juveniles were less competent or culpable than adults and a
finding that their decision-making capabilities are equal to adults undermines
the very laws and system meant to protect these differences.
221. Elizabeth Cauffman et al., Justice for Juveniles: New Perspectives on Adolescents'
Competence and Culpability, 18 QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 403, 406 (1999).
222. See id.
223. Id.
224. See id. at 407.
225. See Thomas Grisso, Juveniles' Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical
Analysis, 68 CAL. L. REv. 1134(1980).
226. See id. at 1164-65.
227. See id.
228. See Cauffman et al., supra note 221, at 408.
229. Id. at 408-09.
230. Id.
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Researchers point to non-cognitive or psychosocial aspects of adoles-
cent development to rebut the argument that teenagers and adults are not
different.23' Some of these psychosocial aspects include responsibility,
which includes self-reliance, clarity of identity, and healthy autonomy; per-
spective, which relates to the ability to see the complexity of the situation
and place it in a larger context; and temperance, or the ability to limit im-
pulses and see the overall situation prior to acting.232 According to Steinberg
and Cauffman, early research shows that adolescents do differ from adults in
many aspects of responsibility, perspective, and temperance, although more
research is necessary. 33 Other researchers examined similar aspects of psy-
chosocial development, and all hypothesize that the development of different
psychosocial aspects could impact how cognitive capacities are employed in
real-world situations.234
By early adolescence, most children have reached "conventional" moral
reasoning. 235 At this stage, the adolescent's moral reasoning is based on how
others will judge his or her behavior.2 36 Elementary age children who have
reached this level focus on pleasing their parents and other adults, while jun-
ior high school students are more concerned with the opinions of their
peers.237 However, most adolescents are only capable of reasoning at this
level in hypothetical situations, and their actual behavior often does not re-
flect their reasoning ability.23
8
By late adolescence or early adulthood, some individuals shift to "post-
conventional" moral reasoning. 239 At this level, reasoning switches from
being concerned with social approval to more important principles like fair-
231. See generally Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, The Cognitive and Affective
Influences on Adolescent Decision-Making, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1763, 1768 (1995); Thomas
Grisso, The Competence of Adolescents as Trial Defendants, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 3,
9-14 (1997); Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Evaluating Adolescent Decision-Making in Legal Con-
texts, 19 LAW & Hum. BEHAV. 221 (1995); Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, Matur-
ity of Judgment in Adolescence: Psychosocial Factors in Adolescent Decision-Making, 20
LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 249 (1996).
232. See Cauffman & Steinberg I, supra note 231, at 1764-65.
233. See id. at 1788.
234. See Cauffman et al., supra note 221, at 412.
235. ABA, KIDS ARE DIFFERENT: How KNOWLEDGE OF ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT
THEORY CAN AID DECISION-MAKING IN COURT 27 (Lourdes M. Rosado ed., 2000), available
at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/macarthur.html [hereinafter KIDS ARE DIFFERENT].
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
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ness and justice.2 4' However, this level of moral reasoning is rare, even in
adults, and most adolescents follow only "conventional" moral reasoning.24'
In addition, research on the moral development of children shows that
although children may be able to distinguish right and wrong, they may not
behave in a way consistent with that understanding.242 Also, the develop-
ment of moral judgment results from the "interaction of impulse with the
response of key externalities, such as parental approval or disapproval.
243
From a developmental perspective, it is grossly unfair to apply the fel-
ony-murder rule to pre-teens like Lionel Tate and Nathaniel Brazil. Such
children, lacking the foresight and judgment of fully competent adults, are
prone to make decisions without careful deliberation, and do not fully under-
stand the consequences of their actions. Studies in both neuroscience and
psychology demonstrate that children do not have the same capacity to con-
trol their behavior or make rational decisions as adults.2 "
V. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
In light of the historical and doctrinal arguments against the use of the
felony-murder rule in cases involving children, there appears to be no good
reason for retaining the felony-murder rule in cases involving children and
teenagers. However, the felony-murder rule is deeply entrenched in the
American legal system and has proven to be resistant to calls for its abolition
for centuries. For this reason, we have proposed a number of solutions to
limit the scope of the felony-murder rule in cases of children and teenagers.
These limits are divided into three categories: 1) the use of the felony-
murder rule against children tried in adult and juvenile court; 2) the use of
the felony-murder rule as a basis for transferring children and teenagers to
the adult court; and 3) the use of the felony-murder rule as mitigation in sen-
tencing juvenile offenders in adult court.
A. Limiting the Use of the Felony-Murder Rule in Juvenile and Criminal
Court Cases
First, we believe that there should be an absolute ban on the felony-
murder doctrine for child defendants under the age of fourteen in adult and
240. KIDS ARE DIFFERENT, supra note 235, at 27.
241. Id. at 28.
242. See Walkover, supra note 203, at 542.
243. Id. at 542-43.
244. See id. at 542; Marty Beyer, Immaturity, Culpability & Competency in Juveniles: A
Study off 7 Cases, 15 CRIM. JUST. 26, 27 (2000).
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juvenile court systems.245 As argued above, at common law, such children
were presumed to be unable to form the criminal intent necessary to prove
the underlying felony. Even if the State can rebut the presumption of inca-
pacity, none of the traditional justifications of the rule make sense in the con-
text of children under the age of fourteen.
The least compelling justification of all is probably the one that explains
the longevity of the felony-murder rule: it eases the prosecution's burden of
proving intent in murder cases. It is the least compelling because it is debat-
able as to whether we should ease the prosecution's burden for a crime that
can carry the death penalty or life without possibility of parole, and espe-
cially debatable when child defendants are involved. As the Lionel Tate case
demonstrates, children under fourteen now face similar draconian penalties if
tried and convicted as adults. Because youth has historically been a mitigat-
ing factor in punishment, we should make it harder, not easier, to impose
such sentences on youthful defendants.
For children ages fourteen to seventeen, we propose a presumptive ban
on using the felony-murder rule. Children in this age range can probably
form the criminal intent of the underlying felony but they still do not have
the same capacity to control their behavior as adults, and often are less capa-
ble of foreseeing the consequences of their actions. Their brains are still
developing in the pre-frontal cortex, the very area which governs delibera-
tion, judgment, and impulse control, and the part of the brain which is argua-
bly the seat of mens rea. In addition, some of these children, especially four-
teen-year-olds and older teens who are mentally limited, may not be compe-
tent to stand trial.24 6 In order to charge fourteen to seventeen-year-olds with
245. Most courts have held that the common law presumption of incapacity does not apply
in juvenile court proceedings. See LAFAVE, supra note 185, § 7.5, at 427-28. The reason for
this rule has been that the infancy defense is unnecessary in light of the juvenile court's reha-
bilitative and non-punitive purposes. See id. § 7.5, at 428. This rule continues to be the pre-
vailing rule despite the fact that the modem juvenile court is far more punitive than its
predecessors. See Shepherd, supra note 219, at 46 (applying the felony-murder rule, which
has the effect of making it easier to convict and punish juveniles, in a "rehabilitative" juvenile
court makes little sense).
246. For the most recent study, see Thomas Grisso et al., Juveniles' Competence to Stand
Trial: A Comparison of Adolescents' and Adults' Capacities as Trial Defendants, 27 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 333 (2003), available at http://www.childrensrights.org/Policy/policyresources
_juvenilejuvenilescompetence.htm. See also Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less
Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and
the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1014 (2003); Richard J. Bonnie &
Thomas Grisso, Adjudicative Competence and Youthful Offenders, in YOUTH ON TRIAL 87
(Thomas Grisso et al. eds., 2000). See generally Thomas Grisso, What We Know About
Youths' Capacities as Trial Defendants, in YOUTH ON TRIAL 146-52 (Thomas Grisso et al.
eds., 2000); Alan E. Kazdin, Adolescent Development, Mental Disorders, and Decision Mak-
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felony-murder, prosecutors should bear a heavy burden. They should be
required to prove by "clear and convincing" evidence that the defendant is a
fit subject for application of the felony-murder rule. This burden can be met
by evidence that the defendant was capable of forming the criminal intent of
the underlying felony; that the alleged offense was committed in an aggres-
sive or violent manner; that death or great bodily harm is a natural and prob-
able consequence of the defendant's actions; and that the defendant's actions
are the proximate and legal cause of the victim's death.247
The above-mentioned rules seek to constrain the application of the fel-
ony-murder rule to children and teenagers who are tried in the adult court. In
other words, they seek to impose restrictions on the ability of prosecutors to
charge children and teenagers in adult court with first-degree murder under a
felony-murder theory. We also believe that judges, prosecutors, and legisla-
tors should be constrained from using the felony-murder rule as a basis for
transferring children and teenagers to the adult court in the first instance.
Under such a rule, prosecutors could no longer seek an indictment for murder
based strictly upon a felony-murder theory in order to prosecute a juvenile in
adult and legislators should carve out an exception for felony-murder when
drafting statutes that require that cases involving juveniles charged with
murder must originate in the criminal, rather than the juvenile court.
B. Limiting the Use of the Felony-Murder Rule to Transfer Cases to the
Adult Court
In the 1990s, in response to an alarming increase in juvenile violence,
many states enacted tough transfer laws.248 Using the sound bite "adult time
ing of Delinquent Youths, in YOUTH ON TRIAL 33 (Thomas Grisso et al. eds., 2000). To ensure
that child-defendants who clearly lack the capacity to be tried as adults are not wrongfully sent
to the criminal courts, all children should engage in competency hearings prior to any transfer
decision. Informal research revealed that only one state, Virginia, requires a hearing on a
youth's competence to stand trial before waiver to criminal court. See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-
269.1 (Michie 2003). Arkansas requires a transfer hearing but competence is only one factor
in a list of many that is considered by the judge in determining whether to transfer. See ARK.
CODE ANN. § 9-27-318(g) (Michie 2002).
247. See generally LAFAVE, supra note 185, § 7.5, at 671-72. These circumstances track
the ways in which courts have sought to limit the felony-murder rule to mitigate its harshness.
See id.
248. In the decade from 1984 to 1994, the number of murders committed by youth nearly
tripled from 823 to 2320. The overall serious violent crime rate (including homicide, rape,
robbery, and aggravated assault) among youths aged twelve to seventeen also soared - from
twenty-nine offenses per 1000 youth in 1986 to fifty-two in 1993. See RICHARD A. MENDEL,
LESS HYPE, MORE HELP: REDUCING JUVENILE CRIME, WHAT WORKS -- WHAT DOESN'T, Am.
Youth Policy Forum, 30-31 (2000). As Frank Zimring has demonstrated:
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for adult crime" as their mantra, critics of the juvenile court pushed for laws
to make it easier to prosecute juveniles as adults.249 Their successful efforts
produced a legal response to serious and violent juvenile crime, which
flushed pre-teens, first-time offenders, and even non-violent offenders into
an adult criminal court system that had all but abandoned the concept of re-
habilitation. As a result of harsh mandatory minimum sentencing policies,
the abolition of parole, and "truth-in sentencing laws," which required con-
victed defendants to serve most or all of their prison terms, criminal court
judges could no longer use youthfulness to mitigate sentences.
These new transfer laws differed from past practices. Historically,
transfers had been reserved for older teens who were recidivists or who had
committed especially heinous crimes. Since the United States Supreme
Court's 1966 decision in Kent v. United States,50 judicial waiver had been
the most common approach to transferring juveniles to criminal court.251 The
Kent decision enumerated a list of substantive factors to guide judges in
making transfer decisions, and many states simply adopted these standards in
[T]he most important reason for the sharp escalation in homicide [among offenders 13 to 17]
was an escalating volume of fatal attacks with firearms ... That homicide increases are only
gun cases has two important implications. First, it would require only a small number of at-
tacks to change the death statistics during the 1985 to 1992 period. Because gunshot wounds
are deadly, a relatively small number of woundings can produce a relatively large number of
killings .... The second implication of the guns-only pattern is that the hardware used in
many attacks seems to be the major explanation for the expanding rate rather than any basic
change in the youth population involved in the assaults.
FRANKLIN ZIMRrNG, AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE 35-36 (1998). For the best introduction to
the theory and practice of transfer, see JEFFREY FAGEN & FRANKLIN ZIMRING, THE CHANGING
BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT (2000).
See generally Barry C. Feld, Legislative Exclusion of Offenses from Juvenile Court Jurisdic-
tion: A History and Critique, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, 83-135
(2000), for a history of the statutory exclusion of specific offenses, including murder.
249. MENDEL, supra note 248. It's hard to pinpoint who coined the phrase "adult time for
adult crimes," but the phrase clearly permeated the political scene in the mid-1990s. In fact,
virtually every major Republican gubernatorial candidate in the mid-1990s mouthed the
words. See, e.g., Laurence Hammack, 'Compassion' May Be Lost Gov. Allen Accepts Report
That Proposes Tougher Penalties on Juvenile Offenders, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS,
Oct. 6, 1995, at Cl; Jon R. Sorensen, Pataki Plan on Juvenile Offenders Includes Longer;
Sentences in Adult Jails, BUFFALO NEWS, Dec. 10, 1995, at 16A; Governor Pete Wilson of
California Sets State Agenda (Transcript # 1777-10, Nat'l Pub. Radio Morning Ed., Jan. 9,
1996); Editorial, The Young Killers: Adult Crimes Warrant Adult Time, WORCESTER
TELEGRAM & GAZETTE, June 10, 1996, at A6; Judy Putnam, Engler Proposes 'Punks' Do
'Adult Time for Adult Crimes', GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, July 27, 1995, at C3. For a history of
juvenile transfer laws, dating from the inception of the juvenile court, see David S. Tanenhaus
& Steven A. Drizin, "Owing to the Extreme Youth of the Accused": The Changing Legal
Response to Juvenile Homicide, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 641,699 (2002).
250. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
251. Seeid.at556.
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their juvenile codes verbatim or with minor modifications.252 The 1990s
revolution in the transfer laws, however, differed from past efforts to try
more children as adults in two significant ways: 1) the decision to transfer
was less often a judicial decision; it was now increasingly the province of
prosecutors or the legislatures; and 2) younger children could now be tried as
adults for a wider array of offenses.253
Although judicial waivers used to make up the bulk of the children in
adult court, today, prosecutorial and legislative waivers predominate. In
1997, for example, an estimated 8400 juveniles were waived from juvenile
court to adult court by judges.5 Because prosecutorial waivers and legisla-
tive waivers, however, are more difficult to track, it is currently not known
how many total youths under eighteen years of age are prosecuted as adults
each year, but at least one estimate places the number as high as 200,000.25
A recent multi-jurisdictional study of adult courts in eighteen large urban
counties revealed that eighty-five percent of all transfer decisions during a
six-month period from January 1, 1998 to June 30, 1998 were made by
prosecutors (45%) and/or legislatures (40%), instead of judges. 56
The shift from a transfer regime in which judges made most of the deci-
sions to one in which prosecutors and legislatures do the deciding necessarily
means that the system has become more rigid and less flexible in deciding
which juveniles stay in juvenile court and which are tried as adults. Legisla-
tive waivers are typically based on only two factors: the minor's age at the
time of the offense and the nature of the alleged offense.257 Prosecutorial
252. Id. at 566-67. These factors include the seriousness of the offense, prosecutorial
merit, the sophistication and maturity of the child, the child's past history of delinquency,
responses to prior juvenile court efforts at rehabilitation, and the ability of the juvenile court's
dispositions to rehabilitate the child and protect the public. Id.
253. Twenty-three states now have at least one provision, typically governing children
charged with murder or other violent felonies, which places no bottom age limit for juveniles
to be transferred to criminal court. See SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 209, at 106.
254. EILEEN POE-YAMAGATA & MICHAEL A. JONES, BUILDING BLOCKS FOR YOUTHS, AND
JUSTICE FOR SOME 2 (1998), available at http://www.buildingblocksforyouth.org/justice
forsome.
255. Id. at 13; see SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 209, at 106. Not all of the estimated
200,000 youths under eighteen who are prosecuted as adults each year are "transfers." Many
of these youths come from the thirteen states where the upper age limit for juvenile court
jurisdiction is fifteen or sixteen, meaning that their cases originate in adult court and that they
are considered "adults" as soon as they are arrested for a crime. Id.
256. JOLANTA JUSZKIEWICZ, BUILDING BLOCKS FOR YOUTHS, YOUTH CRIME/ADULT TIME:
IS JUSTICE SERVED? (2001), http://www.buildingblocksforyouth.org/ycat/ycat.
html.
257. BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE
COURT 210 (1999).
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waiver decisions are often based on three factors: 1) the minor's age; 2) the
seriousness of the alleged offense; and 3) the minor's criminal history.258
The minor's amenability to treatment, social and emotional age, family back-
ground, and mental and intellectual capacity are not often available at the
time that prosecutors decide to seek a transfer.259 Waiting to acquire such
information is often a luxury most prosecutors believe they cannot afford,
especially in cases in which a victim has died.
We agree that in many cases, the seriousness of the offense should be a
significant factor in the transfer decision. Many felony-murders, however,
are not among the most "serious offenses." The underlying crimes can be
less serious but can still result in the unintentional or unforeseeable result of
the victim's death. For this reason, we propose that children charged with
felony-murder should not be eligible for legislative or prosecutorial waiver,
unless the underlying felony could itself have led to a transfer to adult court.
This is the rule which has been adopted in New York. For example, in Peo-
ple v. Roper,260 the New York Court of Appeals overturned a juvenile defen-
dant's conviction for felony-murder because the child-defendant could not
have been tried for the underlying felony in adult court.21 The court noted
that murder in the first-degree requires "felonious intent," which in felony-
murder cases comes from the underlying felony.262 Since Roper could not be
charged as an adult with the "felony" of robbery, he lacked the implied intent
necessary for felony-murder.263
In judicial waiver hearings, which typically involve a weighing of fac-
tors relating to the seriousness of the offense, the minor's criminal history,
and the minor's prospects for rehabilitation before reaching the age of major-
ity, there should be a presumption against transferring juveniles to adult
court on felony-murder charges; a presumption which can be overcome with
evidence that the underlying felony was committed in an aggressive, violent,
premeditated, or willful manner. At the very least, minors who are waived to
adult court on felony-murder charges should be given the opportunity to have
"reverse waiver" hearings, hearings in which criminal court judges have the
ability to send juvenile defendants back to juvenile court, either for their tri-
als or for sentencings. Such hearings act as a check against prosecutorial
258. See Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy: A Case Study of Juvenile Justice
Law Reform, 79 MINN. L. REV. 965, 1006-07 (1995).
259. See id. at 1007-08.
260. 259 N.Y. 170 (1932).
261. Id. at 177.
262. Id.
263. Id.
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overcharging and ensure that only the most culpable juveniles are eligible for
adult prosecution.2
C. Limiting the Death Penalty and Life Without Parole Sentences in Cases
of Juvenile Felony-Murder
Finally, we believe that felony-murder convictions of sixteen and seven-
teen-year-olds should be exempted from the death penalty in the twenty-two
states 265 that permit it and children of all ages who are convicted of felony-
murder should be exempted from the sentence of life without the possibility
of parole. Such draconian sentences should be reserved for the most culpa-
ble offenders, and both the youth of juvenile defendants and the fact that they
committed "felony-murder" should exempt them from this class of offend-
ers.266 When a reduced level of intent is used to convict, a reduced sentence
should be handed down.
264. Approximately twenty-four states have "reverse waiver" statutes. See SNYDER &
SICKMUND, supra note 209. Such statutes are especially important in jurisdictions that rely
extensively on legislative and prosecutorial waivers. In these jurisdictions, reverse waiver can
act as a check against overcharging by prosecutors by allowing for an examination of the
minor's role in the alleged offense, potential for rehabilitation, and other factors beyond the
minor's age, and the seriousness of the charged offense. Reverse waiver statutes also mitigate
the consequences of overly broad transfer statutes that sweep into criminal court accomplices,
non-violent, first-time offenders, and defendants charged with felony-murder. See Tanenhaus
& Drizin, supra note 249.
265. ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE SYS., CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, FACTSHEET: THE JUVENILE
DEATH PENALTY (2003), http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/factsheetgeneral.pdf.
266. In Atkins v. Virginia, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the execution of the
mentally retarded violates the "cruel and unusual punishment" clause of the United States
Constitution. 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). Among the reasons cited for this decision was the
majority of the Court's belief that the mentally retarded, because of their limited mental ca-
pacity, were less culpable than adult offenders of average intelligence. Id. In the wake of
Atkins, the dissent of Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer to the denial of certiorari in the
case of Toronto Patterson, urged the full Court to revisit the issue of whether it is still consti-
tutional to execute children over the age of fifteen. Patterson v. Texas, 536 U.S. 984 (2002)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Many of the same arguments for reduced culpability of the mentally
retarded have already been argued in the cases of juveniles on death row. See In re Stanford,
537 U.S. 968 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Brief for Petitioner on Petition for Writ of Cer-
tiorari to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeal, Beazley v. Cockrell, 534 U.S. 945 (2001) (No.
00-10618), available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/Beazleycert02.pdf; Brief for
Petitioner on Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeal, Patterson
v. Cockrell, 536 U.S. 967 (2002) (No. 0 1-10028), available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust
/juvjus/supreme%20court%/o20petition.pdf.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The cases which we have highlighted in this article-Lionel Tate, Na-
thaniel Brazill, and Jonathan Miller-highlight the unfairness of applying the
felony-murder doctrine to cases involving children and adolescents, and il-
lustrate the devastating consequences that result when the eoctrine is used to
secure murder convictions against youthful defendants in criminal court. In
Lionel Tate's case, a boy who may not have been competent to stand trial for
murder-he was unable to decide on his own whether to take a reasonable
plea offer or roll the dice by going to trial-was convicted and sentenced to
life in prison without parole. In Nathaniel Brazill's case, a boy whose emo-
tions overcame his judgment and who, upon reflection, could not even un-
derstand what had caused him to kill his favorite teacher, was convicted and
sentenced to twenty-eight years in prison. In Jonathan Miller's case, a boy
who neither intended to kill his victim, nor could have foreseen that the boy
would die from a punch to the head, was convicted and sentenced to life in
prison. Applying the felony-murder rule in such cases borders on "cruel and
unusual punishment" because the connection between culpability and pun-
ishment is severed in two ways. By allowing a defendant to be punished for
a crime he did not intend to commit and for results he did not intend to cause,
the rule takes a first cut at the connection between culpability and punish-
ment. When the rule is applied to children and teenagers, the rule takes a
second, and perhaps even deeper, cut-it denies the historical connection
between youth, culpability, and punishment, a connection which is supported
by developmental psychological research and more recent studies of the
structure and function of the teenage brain.267
The felony-murder rule has proven to be extremely resistant to the
many attacks which have been leveled against it throughout the ages. It con-
tinues not only to survive, but to thrive, in many jurisdictions throughout the
United States. It should no longer be allowed to thrive in cases involving
children and teenagers.
267. See Kim Taylor-Thompson, States of Mind, States of Development, 14 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REV. 143 (2003) (arguing for a developmental analysis of mens rea concepts).
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